Towards the realization of a sustainable, fair and inclusive society, we propose a novel decisionmaking model that incorporates social norms in a rational choice model from the standpoints of deontology and utilitarianism, and make a hypothesis that interprets choice of action as the X-point for individual utility function increasing with actions and social norm function decreasing with actions. This hypothesis is based on humans balancing the value of utility and the value of norms psychologically in choosing actions. Using the hypothesis and approximation, we were able to isolate and infer utility function and norm function from real-world measurement data of actions on environmental conditions, and elucidate the interaction between the both functions to lead actions from current to target. As examples of collective data that aggregate decision-making of individuals, we looked at the changes in power usage before and after the Great East Japan Earthquake and the correlation between national GDP and CO2 emission in different countries. The first example is interpreted that the benefits for power (i.e., utility of power usage) is stronger than the power usage restrictions imposed by norms after the earthquake, contrary to our expectation.
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it." in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" (Smith, 1759) . Arrow said "I want, however, to conclude by calling attention to a less visible form of social action: norms of social behavior, including ethical and moral codes. I suggest as one possible interpretation that they are reactions of society to compensate for market failures. " as to how a complete contract cannot exist in real society (Arrow, 1970) .
As examples of previous research on social norms taking over the discussion of Smith and Arrow, philosopher Joseph Heath has proposed the adoption of normative appropriateness as deontic constraints into a rational choice model based on the expected utility theory for decision-making (Heath, 2008) . Economist Kaushik Basu has acknowledged the existence of subjective moral costs in decision-making (Basu, 2010) . Economist Masahiko Aoki has shown that community norms emerge intrinsically when the cost for cooperation is smaller than the loss from social ostracization, by linking the commons game and social exchange game (Aoki, 2001) . Economist Samuel Bowles has forwarded the importance of moral motivation and social preference in markets based on incomplete contracts (Bowls, 2017) . The common viewpoint of these researches is that they all point out the need for incorporating social norms, which include morals and ethics, not only economic utility, into individual decision-making models.
Utilizing these discussions on social norms, performing diagnosis, prognosis, and intervention into the social system as social practices requires linking data measured in the real world with the decision-making model. Thus far, altruism and reciprocity have been studied through experiments such as the prisoner's dilemma game and the public goods game, and empirical studies regarding the return potential in group norms have been conducted through questionnaire surveys (Sasaki, 2000) . No inferences have so far been made, however, regarding the relationship of utility and norm based on actual measurement data. Moreover, although the forms of utility functions, such as the difference between convex and concave functions, and between gains and losses, have been studied and actions have been explained, no research delving into why those actions have been selected has thus far been conducted.
In this paper, in Section 2, we review the decision-making model from the perspectives of deontology and utilitarianism in the light of previous research, and propose a new hypothesis that reinterprets the individual's value function as the sum of utility function and norm function and treats the choice of action as the X-point for the utility function and the norm function. In Section 3, as examples, we will present the results of measurements of power usage before and after the Great East Japan Earthquake and data on national GDP per-capita and CO2 emissions for different countries, isolate and infer utility function and norm function from the measurement data based on the hypothesis, and try to explain the interaction between the two functions. In Section 4, we will discuss the significance of the new X-point model in understanding individual and group decisionmaking, as well as discuss methods for the diagnosis, prognosis, and intervention by IT systems into social systems (individual action, inter-individual interaction, and institution). And, in Section 5, we will summarize our conclusions and discuss future plans towards the realization of a sustainable, fair and inclusive society.
Decision-making model

Rational choice
A major decision-making theory is the rational choice theory in microeconomics (e.g., Gilboa, 2010) . It is based on the principle that individuals choose the rational action that maximizes utility based on methodological individualism. This theory is related to Adam Smith's Invisible Hand, one of the mainstream schools of thought in economics claiming that society will attain its optimum state if individuals pursue their self-interests (Heath, 2008; Basu, 2010) . We will not discuss them all here, but this theory has been applied into the expected utility theory, subjective probability theory, prospect theory, and other theories pertaining to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and risk, and has been widely used in game theory as application into sociology and political science, as well as in social choice theory, public choice theory, and comparative institutional analysis.
In the standard rational choice model, during decision-making, the individual assigns a confidence level to beliefs in particular states, allocates cardinal priority criteria to desires for particular results, and maximizes the expected utility of the action. In the decision-making tree as shown in Figure 1 , the individual prunes the s ( ) based on beliefs, and prunes the ( ) based on desires.
The individual utility function ( ( )) is expressed in equation (1) below, i.e., for every outcome ( ), multiply the utility of ( ( )) by the probability of given ( ), ( ( | )), then add these all up (Heath 2008) . The individual chooses the action ( ) with the highest utility function ( ( )).
Figure 1 Decision tree (Heath, 2008) .
As an argument against the rational choice theory, some authors claim that it does not take into consideration that the individual makes altruistic and obligatory actions against his/her selfinterests. For example, the experimental game theory pertaining to the collective action problem has proven that subjects exhibit cooperation and coordination at levels considerably higher than those predicted by the standard model. This is because humans socially learn and follow social norms, including language, customs, and culture, through imitative conformity (Heath, 2008) . From the standpoint of economics, the opportunity set of the individual's action is greater than the budget set of the goods, and the Invisible Hand theorem does not always lead society to its optimum state. It can be said, however, that society is established because social norms restrict the opportunity set of the individual's actions (Basu, 2010) .
So far, in an attempt to incorporate social norms into rational choice models, for example, adding an increase in utility to the kindness of others (Rabin, 1993) , or adding a reduction of utility to the degree of inequality between oneself and others (Fehrand Schmidt, 1999) have been considered.
However, modifications that add the benefits of interaction with others to the utility function can not account for a wide range of norms and anonymous cooperative behavior. Also, among the several versions of reciprocity altruism, direct reciprocity can not explain broad sociality without direct relationship. Indirect reciprocity has primary dilemma (why cooperate?) and secondary dilemma (why do expensive sanctions?). In order to solve these dilemmas, it is necessary to further assume higher order sanctions, or linking primary and secondary cooperative actions (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Yamagishi and Takahashi, 1994) , but still these reasons can not be explained. Strong reciprocity describes the norms of cooperation by assuming the willingness to do costly altruistic punishment as a result of group selection (Bowles and Gintis, 2011) , but can not explain other norms such as fairness. Empirical studies of reciprocity have shown that high-order sanctions and heavy punishment are not observed, and that inexpensive sanctions (e.g., break-off of relations, light attention, etc.) are the main (Kiyonari and Barclay, 2008; Guala, 2012) .
Therefore, in incorporating social norms into rational choice models, we would like to reconsider from two major perspectives: deontology and utilitarianism. In deontology according to Immanuel Kant, humans are expected to follow universal moral rules dictated by reason, and good will is an action only based on following one's faith, wherein norms and ethics do not be reduced to utility.
On the other hand, in utilitarianism, the social desirability of an action is determined by utility, and the goal is to maximize the summation of individual utility ("the greatest happiness of the greatest number"), wherein norms and ethics are embedded in utility.
Although deontology is based on reason, this reason or rational thinking, from the perspective of social constructivism, is socially constructed along with the norms, such as language, customs, and culture. Norm conformity develops through imitative learning during childhood and social learning from the cultural environment, and cannot be isolated from the rational subject. A simple method for incorporating deontological constraints for actions into the rational choice model, in the same way as with utilities for desires, is by handling norms based on reason as instruments (Heath, 2008) .
In accordance with Savage's trichotomy (states, actions and outcomes), the normative principle connected to the actions are conceived in the same way as the beliefs connected to the states and the outcomes connected to the desires, and normative appropriateness is assigned as weight in considering actions. Therefore, the individual's value function ( ( )) can be expressed as the sum of utility ( ( )) and normative appropriateness ( ( )), as shown in equation (2).
Examples of social norms based on utilitarianism are community norms that serve as self-enforcing solutions to the commons problem (Aoki, 2001) . In this case, the emergence of community norms can be seen by linking the commons game and the social exchange game. The value function ( ( ))
can be expressed from the utility ( ( )) and cooperation cost ( ( )) in the commons domain, such as in common water supplies and commonly owned forests, and the utility ( ( )) and cooperation cost ( ( )) in the social exchange domains, such as in mutual aid and cooperative, as shown in equation (3). The incentive condition for cooperation can be expressed by equation (4), with the current cooperation cost saving terms on the left-hand side, and the current value conversion (where is the discount factor) of the loss term arising from permanent social ostracization in the future on the right-hand side. When this condition holds true, the common expectation against social ostracization of shirks generates a cooperative community norm.
We derived the mathematical equations (2) and (3) for a rational choice model that incorporates social norms from both the standpoints of deontology and utilitarianism. In deontology, norms are shown as intrinsic values by instrumentally treating deontic constraints due to reason. On the other hand, in utilitarianism, the utility of the social exchange that underlies the norm is shown as extrinsic value. Their mathematical expressions, although having different premises, are similar and can therefore be treated equally when incorporating them as information model for social practices.
Further, when the preference order for relative to ( ) is opposite that of the preference order for relative to ( ), or when ( ) is expressed as an increasing function of , and ( ) is expressed as a decreasing function of , then ( ) becomes a cost and constraint. If the normative cost ( ( ))
is redistributed as tax to society, or ( ) is assumed as cooperating cost ( ( ) + ( )) in social exchange, deontology can also be regarded as being reduced to social utility. Figure 2 shows the relationship of a rational choice model that takes social norms into consideration with the opportunity set, determinants, factors, etc. of the action. As a combination of equations (2) and (3), value function ( ( )) is expressed as the sum of the positive term ( ( )) and the negative term ( ( )) of the utility function, and the positive term ( ( )) and the negative term ( ( )) of the norm function. Determinants, which include the effectiveness and feasibility of the action; economic benefit/profit and cost/risk; and ethical duty/honor and norm/obligation (Hirose, 1994) , shows movement of the position of the boundaries between a subjective and intuitive System 1 and an objective and rational System 2, depending on the familiarity with or importance of the action (Kahneman, 2011) , indicating that the level of judgment for choosing actions fluctuates between reflexive, intuitive, considerative, and deliberative.
Utility function and norm function
Inferring the relationship between utility and norm from actual measurement data to elucidate the reason why a certain action is chosen involves first looking at the relationship between the action and its value. Figure 3 shows the value function ( ( )), utility function ( ( )), and norm function ( ( )) of the action represented as variable ( ). Here, the diminishing utility function commonly seen in the expected utility theory is assumed as the utility function ( ( )), and the return potential function commonly seen in group norms is assumed as the norm function ( ( )). Like the relational expression of the value function ( ( )) in Figure 2 , the value function ( ( )) is the sum of the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )), and here it is assumed that action with the largest value function ( ( )) is the action that is chosen ( ). These relationships are shown in equations (5) to (8). 
If the function forms of the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )) are correct, measurement of the selected action ( ) while changing the environmental conditions will enable identifying coefficients and , and finding the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )). These function forms, however, are not always correct, and they usually take a variety of forms; thus, it is difficult to find the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )) using equation (8). There is a need, therefore, to revise the assumptions of Figure 3 and equations (5) to (8).
As a new hypothesis, therefore, we propose the interpretation of the choice of action as the X-point between the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )). As stated in the last paragraph of Section 2.1, actions are chosen based on conflict between benefit and cost; in other words, the action at the X-point ( ), where the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )) are in equilibrium, becomes selected as shown in Figure 4 . And, by assuming that linear approximation of ( ) and ( ) holds true within the vicinity of the X-point, the relationships between , ( ),
and ( ) can be expressed through equations (9) to (12). 
The problem of finding the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )) is equivalent to finding the slope ( ) and intercept ( ) of ( ), and the slope ( ) and intercept ( ) of ( ).
First, we measure the action ( ) while changing the environmental conditions as shown in Figure   5 , and explain the series of processes for identifying the slopes ( and ). In equation (12) we introduce dependence on the environment ( ), and make the definitions as shown in equations (13) and (14). Figure 5 Dependence of action on environment.
Next, by fitting the results of measurements made while changing the environment ( ) into equation (13), we find the four coefficients ( , , , ) shown in the following equations (15).
Moreover, in order to solve the equations in (15), the following equations (16) are given as two constraint conditions, for example, to divide into and . One is the environmental condition ( ) by which the slope ( ) of the utility function ( ( )) becomes 0, and the other is the environmental condition ( ) by which the slope ( ) of the norm function ( ( )) becomes 0. The former means that utility cannot be gained by performing actions above or below the condition, and the latter means that performing actions below or above the condition will eliminate the normative constraints.
Thus, by solving equations (15) and (16) as a system of equations, we can find coefficients , , and as shown by the equations in (17), and identify the slopes ( and ) by returning these coefficients to the equations in (14).
After finding the slopes ( and ), to find the intercepts ( and ), we assume that linear approximation holds true as shown in equation (18) for the results of measurement of action ( ) in response to the environment ( ), as shown in Figure 5 . We then yield equation (19) by matching equation (18) with equations (13) and (15).
We substitute equation (19) with equation (17) to obtain equation (20), and then find the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )), as shown from equations (14) and (15) to (21).
Here, since the intercepts ( and ) are in a relative relationship in terms of the X-point between the utility function ( ( )) and the norm function ( ( )), we can obtain equation (22) by moving the origin of equation (21).
Equation (22) shows that the action ( ) can be interpreted as the X-point between the utility function ( ′( )) and norm function ( ′( )), which are isolated from the two environmental conditions ( ， ) and from the constants and obtained from the results of measurement of action ( ) in response to the environment ( ). For example, in Figure 6 Assuming that the utility function ( ′( )) and norm function ( ′( )) can be obtained from the current results of measurement of action ( ) in response to the environment ( ) as shown in Figure 7 , there are four approaches (I, II, III and IV) to achieving the target, depending on the slope ( ) and intercept ( ) of ′( ), and the slope ( ) and intercept ( ) of ′( ), as shown in Table 1 .
Among these, approaches II and IV, which pertain to norms, correspond respectively to "marginal crowding in" and "categorical crowding in" mentioned by Bowles and may be useful in considering the effects of economic incentives on norms (Bowls, 2017). 
Examples
Power usage
To try of the new hypothesis on rational choice as the X-point of utility function and norm function, we applied it to the actual results of power usage measurements in response to outdoor temperature within areas serviced by Tokyo Electric Power Company before (August 2010) and after (August 2011) the Great East Japan Earthquake (Chikamoto, 2012) . Temperatures were corrected to include the effect of the temperatures in the two previous days. Although this example does not involve decision-making by individuals, it allows us to see the changes in group decision-making and group norms before and after the disaster as the aggregate of individual decision-making. From the measurement results shown in Figure 8 , we obtained equation (23) to represent the correlation between power usage and temperature before the disaster and equation (24) to represent the correlation after the disaster. In these equations, temperature corresponds to environment ( ) and power usage corresponds to action ( ). The constraint conditions for the environment and the action were derived based on Figure 8 . The temperatures at which the residents started to use power were set as the before and after the disaster. The was set to 30°C since the slight inflection point seen from the plot before and after the disaster indicates that normative constraints lose their effect once the temperature exceeds 30°C for the residents' health. 
Solving equations (23) and (24) by following equations (18) to (22) shown in Section 2 yields the equations for utility function ( ′( )) and norm function ( ′( )) for the measurement results (25) and (26). Figure 9 shows the relationship between action and ′( )， ′( ) before the disaster, and Figure 10 shows their relationship after the disaster. In Figure 9 and Figure Figure 11 shows a comparison of utility function and norm function before and after the disaster when the temperature, which represents the environment ( ), is at 28°C. The slope of the utility function ( ′( )) is larger after the disaster compared to that before the disaster, which is consistent with approach I shown in Table 1 . In other words, we can say that the utility gained from using power has increased after the disaster. Unexpectedly, for the norm function ( ′( )), the slope was smaller after the disaster compared to that before the disaster, which is the opposite of approach II shown in Table 1 . In other words, it can be said that after the disaster, rather than simply and strictly controlling their use of power, residents are trying to use power more efficiently and carefully, based on the relationship of utility and norms. This means that although residents have started using power at a lower temperature ( ) after the disaster, they have in fact reduced their power usage. Figure 11 Comparison of utility function and norm function before and after the disaster.
CO2 emissions
As another example based on actual measurements, we will look at the data on CO2 emissions in relation to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of different countries around the world (Archer, 2018) . The country is not an individual decision itself, but a collection of individual decisions. countries with higher CO2 emissions (mainly developing nations). In these equations, economic environment expressed by GDP represents the environment ( ), and CO2 emission represents the action ( ). In regard to the constraint condition, since norms become meaningless when both GDP and CO2 emission are 0, we set the constraint condition as = 0 $. Also, on the basis of a study on GDP and life satisfaction (Eurostat, 2018) , we assumed that utility reaches saturation at of 30,000 $ or higher. and norm function ( ′( )). Figure 13 shows a comparison of countries with low and those with high CO2 emissions when GDP, representing the environment ( ), is at 20,000 $. Although the utility functions ( ′( )) of the two groups are the same, the intercepts of their norm functions ( ′( )) differ, which is consistent with approach IV shown in Table 1 . Although the utility provided by economic activities that result in the release of CO2 is the same between the countries with low CO2 emissions and those with high CO2 emissions, the bases of the norms that serve to suppress the CO2 emissions for the two groups of countries are different. As shown in the COP (the conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), it can be said that reducing CO2 emissions on a global scale requires nurturing the norms particular to each country, and institutionalizing reduction measures based on those norms. Reducing CO2 emissions, therefore, is evidently related to norms.
Countries with low CO2 emissions:
Countries with high CO2 emissions: Figure 13 Comparison of countries with high and low CO2 emissions.
Discussions
Review of Results
Through the above two examples, we were able to isolate utility function and norm function from actual measurement data and understand their interaction by applying the hypothesis that rational choices are made based on the X-point between utility function and norm function. In the example pertaining to power usage before and after disaster, it was interpreted that rather than enforcing stricter norms as had been expected, using power with a sense of appreciation is more effective in suppressing power usage. This seems to correspond to the results that perceived benefits affected significantly and social norms don't affected directly in the internet-based survey conducted after the earthquake on household electricity saving behavior (Yagita et al., 2012) . In the example pertaining to GDP of different countries, it was interpreted that there are no differences in the utility provided by economic activities that result in the release of CO2, and that the norms of each country play a significant role in reducing CO2 emissions. These conclusions were not simply deduced from the actual data in Figure 8 and Figure 12 , but can be considered as new knowledge gained by applying our hypothesis.
Effects
Thus far, the interpretation of real-world actions has been investigated in terms of the assignment of meaning to actions based on the function form of the utility function in relation to the rational choice theory, as well as through experiments on altruism and reciprocity in relation to the game theory and surveys on group norms by questionnaire. We believe that the isolation and visualization of utility function and norm function from actual measurement data through our hypothesis will drive the progress of conventional research, and is significant in promoting social practices.
Diagnosis and prognosis based on our hypothesis will be important in performing real-time normative intervention of social systems.
In our hypothesis, we used constraint conditions and dependence of the action on the environment to find the utility function and the norm function. If constraint conditions and dependence of the action on parameters other than the environment are known, they may also be used to find the utility function and the norm function using the same procedure. In regard to constraint conditions, other than the conditions used in our hypothesis, reference points such as that of the prospect theory, can also be used as constraint conditions. The important contribution of our hypothesis lies in being able to connect actual measurement data with utility function and norm function.
Although the examples presented in this study pertain to groups of people serviced by the Tokyo Electric Power Company and citizens of countries of the world, our hypothesis can also be applied to actions of individual. Thus, it can be useful in understanding personality and characteristics of groups as well as individuals. In the relationship between choice of actions and the rational choice model that incorporates social norms shown in Figure 2 , the determinants of the action and the factors related to the determinants are related to behavioral economics and the nudge theory (method for inducing behavior). Individual diagnosis on utility and norms based on our hypothesis can be used in urging individuals to take normative actions.
By the way, as a future vision of the social system, for example, the Japanese government proposes "Society 5.0." Society 5.0 is defined as "a human-centered society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social problems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace and physical space" (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2014) and succeeds the hunter-gatherer society (Society 1.0), agricultural society (Society 3.0), industrial society (Society 3.0), and information society (Society 4.0). Until the information society, the analysis of data and the explanation and prediction of phenomena were performed according to astronomical and physical paradigms. In Society 5.0, the integration of cyberspace (IT systems) and physical space (social systems) has enabled the diagnosis and prognosis of social phenomena in real time according to clinical medical paradigms, leading to the clinical intervention of social systems by IT systems (Deguchi et al., 2018a) .
From the human-centered perspective, Society 5.0 aims to solve social problems such as the redistribution of wealth and the remediation of regional disparities, as well as enable an active and enjoyable life for everyone. Likewise, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations are aimed at eradication of poverty and hunger, reduction of income disparity and inequality, affordable energy and environmental preservation, inclusive employment and institutions, etc. to realize a sustainable, diverse, and inclusive society for all (United Nations, 2018) . Achieving these goals requires a consideration of social norms, morals, and ethics, such as impartiality, fairness, virtue, and justice. In other words, Society 5.0 aims to incorporate utility in terms of convenience and efficiency of products and services, as well as normativity and ethics, into IT systems.
Combining the human-centric perspective with the perspective of integrating society and IT in Society 5.0, as shown in Figure 14 , entails IT systems to perform diagnosis and prognosis of social systems and carry out real-time normative and ethical interventions to social systems based on the diagnosis and prognosis (Deguchi et al., 2018a; Deguchi et al., 2018b; Karasawa et al., 2018) . In addition to targeting social systems composed of groups of people, IT systems must comprehensively capture the macro-level interactions between individuals as well as the meta-level social institutions shared by the groups, based on the micro-level decision-making activities of individuals as platform. In other words, individual decision-making must take into consideration the influence of inter-individual interaction and social institutions, and the effect of social constructivistic normativity, in addition to individualistic utility. 
Summary
Conclusions
To realize the sustainable, fair and inclusive society, we proposed a new decision-making model that incorporates social norms into a rational choice model. On the basis of this new hypothesis that interprets choice of action as the X-point between utility function and norm function, we presented a method for isolating and inferring utility function and norm function from actual measurement data, and interpreted the interaction between the two functions using actual examples.
(1) In place of a standard rational choice model based on methodological individualism, we presented a rational choice model that incorporates social norms from both the standpoint of deontology and utilitarianism. This model expresses the value function in decision-making as the sum of the utility function and norm function. The opportunity set of actions, the determinants, and the various factors are connected together for each of the functions, their positive and negative terms are then consolidated respectively into the weights for benefit and cost, and the action is eventually chosen by comparing the weights.
(2) To distinguish the utility function and norm function from real-world measurement data, we presented a new hypothesis that interprets the choice of action as the X-point between the utility function and the norm function. Using this hypothesis, we derived the relational expressions for finding the utility function ( ′( )) and the norm function ( ′( )) from the linear approximation equation ( • + ) of the measurement data for the action ( ) in response to the environment ( ), and the two constraint conditions ( ， ) related to utility and norm. Also, we presented four approaches to move the current action closer to the target, in accordance with the slopes and intercepts of the two functions obtained from the measurement data.
(3) To assess the new hypothesis, we used it for analyzing two examples as aggregates of individual decision making, namely the measurements of power usage before and after the Great East Japan Earthquake and data on national GDP and CO2 emissions. The former example is interpreted that instead of restriction of power use due to stricter norms, residents were trying to effectively use power based on appreciation for the benefits. In the latter example, the comparison of countries with low and with high CO2 emissions is interpreted that they differed not in terms of the utility of the economic activities, but in terms of the basis of the norms that restricted CO2 emission.
(4) After examining the hypothesis through the above two examples, we considered that the new hypothesis will lead to new interpretations of real-world measurement data, that it will lead to understanding of psychological balancing of benefits and costs in making daily choices of action, that it can contribute to crowding in of norms by economic incentives and in designing public policies, and that it can be applied in the diagnosis, prognosis, and intervention of social systems (individual action, inter-individual interaction, and institution) by IT systems.
Future prospects
To verify our proposed hypothesis, we will collect examples for commons games, trust games, and other game experiments, as well as for natural experiments, and demonstrate the effectiveness of the hypothesis by comparing interpretations based on the hypothesis with conventional interpretations.
At the same time, we will conduct field trials of normative intervention by IT systems using the hypothesis through experiments on cycling of renewable energy in the context of the regional economy.
(1) Individual action: Examine whether persuasion using nudge or provision of information affects utility or norm, and whether they can incite normative action, by isolating the utility function and norm function from actual measurement data for individuals and families.
(2) Inter-individual interaction: Examine how expectation and recognition from others affect utility function and norm function for individuals and families, and whether they would change the results of optimization of distributed cooperative control using IT systems.
(3) Social institutions: Find the utility function and norm function from actual measurement data for groups composed of individuals and families, and consider what kind of intervention should be done to social institutions represented by the group's common expectations.
